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Any discussion of the legal regulation of armaments and the control
of force must begin with an analysis of the strength of international legal
institutions as they are now developed. Such an analysis must be directed to the question of whether those legal institutions are strong
enough to deal with the problems of national security implicit in any
attempt to regulate armaments and control force.
A good start can be made by examining one of our oldest international legal institutions, the treaty or international agreement. As a part
of this analysis it might be advisable to analyze the negotiations that
led to article IV of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (Limited Test Ban
Treaty).'
When the U.S. Delegation, headed by Governor Harriman, arrived
in Moscow in July 1963 to work out a limited test ban on nuclear
weapons, there were two draft treaties before the negotiators for discussion. The U.S. draft was very similar in its provisions to the draft treaty
which had been submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference the
previous August. It had a complex and detailed clause providing for the
conditions of withdrawal and the procedure for calling a conference to
make withdrawal possible.3 The Soviet draft, on the other hand, made
*Dean, Georgetown University Law Center.
'Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter cited as
Limited Test Ban Treaty]. Article IV provides:
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.
'The text of the August 1962 draft treaty appears in 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 415-16 (1962).
'Article III of the 1963 draft treaty was identical in its language to the withdrawal provision of
the 1962 draft. Article Ill provided:
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no provision for withdrawal.
In the two weeks of negotiations during which the U.S. Delegation
was in Moscow, it became clear that the Soviets did not think that such
a withdrawal clause was necessary. They took the position that a nation
has the right to disregard a treaty that is contrary to its supreme national interests. Accordingly, the Soviets took the initial position that a
withdrawal clause in the treaty was not acceptable since its inclusion
might suggest that the right is not inherent. The U.S. Delegation insisted that the treaty be clear on its face regarding this point. A compromise was reached whereby the right of withdrawal was spelled out, but
was less specific than in the original U.S. draft. The provision for withdrawal from the Treaty was described as a right to which the parties
would be entitled in the exercise of their "national sovereignty." 4
Under this formulation there was agreement on the result, and each
of the parties to the negotiation could claim that it had "won" in securing acceptance of its theory of the basis on which the right of withdrawal
exists. This illustration is not cited as an example of "papering-over" a
theoretical difference to reach a practical result. It is cited to show that
no matter what theory is adopted with respect to the nature of an
international legal obligation, there is a consensus in the present world
1. If any Party to this Treaty determines
a. that any other Party has not fulfilled its obligations under this Treaty,
b. that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this
Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national
security, or
c. that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not
possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions, if
conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty, or, if not conducted by a
Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, it may submit to the
Depositary Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the
Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the Depositary Government shall convene
such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The
request for the determining Party to the Depositary Government shall be accompanied
by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based.
2. The conference shall, taking into account the statement of evidence provided by
the determining Party and any other relevant information, examine the facts and assess
the significance of the situation.
3. After the conclusion of the conference or after the expiration of a period of sixty
days from the date of the receipt of the request for the conference by the Depositary
Government, whichever is the earlier, any Party to this Treaty may, if it deems withdrawal from the Treaty necessary for its national security, give notice of such withdrawal
to the Depositary Government. Such withdrawal shall take effect on the date specified
in the notice, which shall in no event be earlier than sixty days from receipt of the notice
of the Depositary Government. The notice shall be accompanied by a detailed statement
of the reasons for the withdrawal.
'Limited Test Ban Treaty, art. IV. The text of article IV is reproduced in note I supra.
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structure that there are very definite limits to the capacity of an international legal obligation to force a country to act contrary to its supreme
national interests. This is putting the matter negatively, as the pessimist
describes the glass as half-empty. The optimist, who describes the glass
as half-full, would state the matter positively by declaring a treaty, or
an international legal document, to be most effective when it formalizes
and institutionalizes the long-range, mutual self-interest of the parties.
To state the capacity of a treaty in these limited terms is not to denigrate
treaties, but to describe them realistically.
On the positive side, the formal nature of a treaty gives it the strength
that a tacit understanding might not have. For one thing, the formality
tends to increase the time period during which the parties may determine that the arrangement operates in their long-range self-interests,
whereas the more informal arrangement may be repudiated in the short
run for its seeming disadvantages. Another positive feature of.the formal treaty is that it tends to provide a legal basis for control mechanisms which neither we nor the Soviets would be prepared to verify in
a tacit arrangement.
A good illustration of the latter point is found in the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty).'
Article III provides for the verification of the obligation of the Treaty
by a system of safeguards "as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated
and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Agency's safeguards system." If this Article is implemented (and there is every reason to believe it will be), it will result in
the application of IAEA safeguards to the nuclear activities of the nonnuclear weapon states in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union has agreed
not to supply nuclear assistance to its Warsaw Pact allies unless it is
subject to these safeguards. This is a real step forward in the acceptance
of international controls by the Soviet Union and will be the direct result
of a treaty. This development probably would not have been possible if
we had merely arrived at a tacit understanding to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons.
Notwithstanding these incremental values of a formal treaty, and the
differences in legal theory as to the nature of a treaty obligation, the
inclusion of the withdrawal clause' in the Limited Test Ban Treaty
reflects a realistic appraisal as to what can be expected of a treaty
'July I, 1968, [1970] 1 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 [hereinafter cited as Non-Proliferation
Treaty].
'Limited Test Ban Treaty, art. IV,
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dealing with matters-of national security. A similar clause is in the NonProliferation Treaty7 and in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.8
It is clear that a similar provision will have to be included in any
agreement which may emerge from the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks. In fact, the extremely high stakes involved in any such agreement
make such a provision critical. A distinguished, former Secretary of
State has stated that any such agreement will have to be subject to
renegotiation every day.
This brings us squarely to the question of what are our perceived longrange mutual self-interests in the field of the regulation of force and the
control of arms. There follows a Table on the Number of Fatalities in
an All-out Strategic Exchange with the Soviet Union. It was prepared
some time ago by Secretary McNamara, but it is still considered essentially accurate by the present Administration. Indeed, it is probably
"conservative" (if one may use that term in this context), since it is
limited to the deaths that would result immediately from the explosion.
It does not include the deaths which would result from pestilence or
famine, or from the fifth horseman of the Apocalypse, radioactive fallout.
7

Non-Proliferation Treaty, art. X.
'Feb. II, 1971, art. VI1 (not yet effective). For the text of the treaty, see 63
pt. 2, at 365-66 (1970).
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TABLE
Numbers of Fatalities in an All-out Strategic Exchange, mid-1970's a)
(In Millions)
Soviets Strike First
Against Military and
City Targets; U.S.
Retaliates Against
Cities
U.S. Fat.

U.S. Program

Soviet Response

NoABM
Sentinel b)

None
None
Pen-Aids
None
MIRV. Pen-Aids
+100 Mobile ICBM's
None
MIRV, Pen-Aids
+550 Mobile ICBM's

Posture A c)

Posture B d)

120
100
120
40
110
110
20
70
100

Soviet Fat.
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120

U.S. Strikes First at
Military Targets; Soviets Retaliate Against
U.S. Cities; U.S. Retaliates Against Soviet Cities
U.S. Fat.

Soviet Fat.

120
90
110
10
60
90
10
40
90

80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80

These figures are truly ghastly. They show that in the event of the
most likely "scenario," that is, a U.S. retaliatory strike after absorbing
a first strike, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would receive 120 million
casualties. They show that if we take certain defensive measures substantially greater than anyone has proposed, and if the Soviets do nothing to counter them, the figures can be reduced substantially. On the
other hand, they show that if the Soviets react to our defensive measures
in a way that does not appear to be unlikely (in view of our reaction to
much less substantial Soviet defensive steps), U.S. fatalities are back up
almost to the same level. On some assumptions the U.S. casualties are
estimated to be 100 million, as opposed to 120 million, but any comfort
obtained from the reduction is quickly dispelled by the footnote which
advises us that with casualties at this level, differences of 10 to 20
million are less than the margin of error in the estimates.
a) At fatality levels of approximately 100 million or more, differences of 10 to 20 million in
the calculated results are less than the margin of errors in the estimates.
b) SAFEGUARD fully deployed would be similar to SENTINEL in its effectiveness.
c) An area defense of the entire continental United States and a relatively low-density
S PR INT defense of 25 cities.
d) A heavier defense with the same area coverage, but with much greater sophistication in
its electronics and a higher-density SPRINT defense for 52 cities. Postures A and B would also
require some improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in order to preclude the
Soviets from undercutting the ABM defense; we would also want to expand and improve our antisubmarine warfare forces to help defend against Soviet missile-launching submarines.
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There is, however, a strong measure of perceived long-range, mutual
self-interest in these figures. They are equally intolerable on both sides.
Both nations have a substantial, mutual self-interest in keeping these
figures only as mere estimates on a piece of paper.
The second mutual self-interest is that both nations want to restrict
the number of "fingers on the button" that can start a nuclear war. Both
want to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The third mutual self-interest is that both sides would prefer to make
allocations for purposes other than weapons buildup. The United States
sometimes questions whether the economy can stand the shock of reduced expenditures on armaments. This may seem paradoxical since the
Soviet Union (which originally held to the Marxist dogma that a capitalistic system needs armaments expenditures to survive) appears to
have more confidence in the flexibility of the capitalistic system than
does the United States. But seriously speaking, both nations would
prefer to spend the money for other purposes.
There are at least two aspects in which the two nations' perceived
long-range self-interests are not similar, indeed are antithetical. The
first is that their respective views on the development of the future world
order are quite inconsistent. When a former Chairman of the Council
of Ministers said he hoped and believed that our grandchildren would
grow up under communism, he meant what he said. But if, as it appears
to be the case, the U.S.S.R. is prepared to carry out its fight against
our system by economic and political means, rather than by war, a
challenge is raised from which we Americans should not shrink.
The second aspect of the dissimilarity is the difference between the
open and the closed society, a difference which is often exaggerated, but
which nevertheless exists. It is very hard for Soviet leaders to accept the
idea of foreign inspectors roaming the Soviet Union to check up on
whether the leaders are doing what they have promised to do. It is hard
enough for the United States, but we operate under a system of checks
and balances. The Soviets operate under a system in which checking on
those in authority assumes quite a different role. The fear that permitting such checks on an international scale might spread to the domestic
front makes it difficult for the Soviets to accept outside verification,
particularly when the verifiers are acting under the authority of an
international organization.
The success that has been achieved so far is not, surprisingly, in areas
where mutual interests are great and adverse interests are few. In the
case of the Limited Test Ban Treaty the major source of adverse interests, i.e., the problem of verification, was absent because the treaty
could be effectively verified by national means without on-site inspec-
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tions. There were major sources of long-range, mutual self-interest.
Both sides were prepared to give up further development of the superweapons, which could not be tested underground; both sides were interested in restraints on testing by others; and both sides were interested
in preventing radioactive fall-out.
An analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is slightly more complex.
Although both sides have a common objective to prevent the further
spread of nuclear weapons, different geographic interests underlie the
objective. The United States interest is concentrated primarily in areas
outside of Europe, and its interest in the treaty is in setting up a worldwide system of control which will limit the immense amounts of fissionable materials produced to meet the growing needs for nuclear energy.
The Soviet interests were more sharply focused on a desire to ensure
that the Federal Republic does not acquire nuclear weapons or control
over them. In order to assure a workable treaty commitment to this
effect, the Soviets were prepared to accept inspection of the peaceful,
nuclear activities, including Soviet-sponsored activities, in all the other
Warsaw Pact countries. Indeed, the last months of the negotiations
presented the paradoxical situation in which the Soviets were urging a
more rigid verification clause than the United States proposed or considered acceptable.
One can pass rather swiftly over the Treaty on Outer Space,9 which
prevents the stationing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction in outer space, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof. ° These two treaties, like the Antarctic Treaty" which was
enacted before them, have as their objective preventive disarmament in
that they prevent deployments for which neither side has any plans in
the foreseeable future. Their value is not inconsiderable, however, since
they probably operate to prevent either side from convincing itself that
it should deploy nuclear weapons to prevent the other side's doing so
first.
This brings us, of course, to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
which at the date of our meeting are at something very close to a state
'Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
1OFeb. 1I, 1971 (not yet effective). For the text of the treaty, see 63 DEP'T STATE BULL., pt. 2,
at 365-66 (1970).
"The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] I U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
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of crisis. Because the negotiations are still in progress, it is a little hard
to say with precision what our perceived, mutual long-range selfinterests are. This speaker feels, however, that it might be accurate if
both nations perceive their mutual interests in this setting: Both have
more than enough offensive missiles; neither has deployed a really effective ABM system; so why shouldn't further deployment simply be
stopped?
A complicating factor is introduced by the relationship between our
respective national-verification capabilities and the disparate way in
which these can be brought to bear on defensive systems. These capabilities are more than acceptably high with respect to defensive systems
deployed, and only slightly less with respect to the number of offensive
launchers deployed. They are substantially less with respect to the quality of the warheads on the offensive missiles. In the case of advanced
offensive warheads, particularly the multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRV's), it might be difficult to verify restrictions on
deployment with sufficient confidence to support a formal agreement.
A possible solution would be the limitation of the formal agreement to
defensive systems alone, but with an understanding that substantial
improvements by either side in offensive capabilities would be grounds
for withdrawal. A somewhat more complicated solution might be to
extend the formal agreement to both defensive systems and the number
of offensive systems deployed, but have the understanding limited to
substantial improvements in the quality of the warheads. Due to the
asymmetric positions of the two powers with respect to future developments in offensive systems, this solution may be somewhat harder to
work out than the first. Either solution, however, would break the
deadly spiral of the offensive-defensive race and would increase the
security of both sides.
The pressure of time has prevented my dealing with three areas which
are on all of our minds: the question of China, the supply of conventional arms to third countries, and the balance of conventional forces
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I would like to deal briefly with
the first two.
Any lasting arms-control arrangement, particularly one which involves substantial cuts, will have to deal with the problem of China. We
should reject the concept, however, that China should only be willing
to talk on the basis of a meeting of the five nuclear powers. Agreement
to this procedure would add substance to the Indian fears that the
development of a nuclear-weapon capability is a sine qua non to greatpower status. This procedure in addition would be a great barrier to
achieving the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and should
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therefore be avoided. The Chinese should be denied veto power over
arrangements which the U.S. and the Soviets might work out in their
long-range mutual interests, because such a veto would not be justified
by the realities of power.
I have very little to say on the subject of restrictions on conventional
arms to other areas, which is dealt with in Professor Forsythe's paper.
I think it appropriate to point out that the comparison of our experience
in the Mid-East with that on the Indian sub-continent makes it clear
that our chances of success, or failure, in this area are a direct function
of the extent to which we and the Soviets perceive that we have a mutual
long-range interest.
I have dealt with this analysis of the impact of treaties in the field of
arms control, not because I am attempting to play down the role of
treaties in this field. I believe that a realistic appraisal of the strength
of treaties, rather than a mere refutation of pacta sunt servanda, is an
essential element in approaching arms control in the interests of national security and a lasting peace.

